I. Introduction
The Statute of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ Statute) provides two different forms of intervention for a third State who is willing to protect its own interest in a case already brought before the Court. If a third State considers that it has a legal interest which may be affected by the decision of the Court in the case, the State is allowed to submit a request to the Court for permission to intervene in accordance with Article 62 of the ICJ Statute. If a multilateral treaty is in question regarding its interpretation before the Court, Article 63 grants a third State who is a party to the treaty the right to intervene in the proceedings.
In the Whaling in the Antarctic case, Japan has argued that New Zealand's declaration of intervention under Article 63 of the ICJ Statute can be interpreted as a strategy to avoid the burden of proving an "interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case," as required under Article 62.
1 By contrast, the Philippines has invoked Article 62 instead of Article 63 to intervene in the Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan case. It considered having an interest of a legal nature which might be affected by the Court's interpretation of certain treaties to which it is the successor-in-interest of one party.
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In the S. S. Wimbledon case, Poland also filed an application for permission to intervene into the interpretation of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles, to which Poland was then also a party, under Article 62 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (hereinafter PCIJ Statute). 3 From a further communications with PCIJ, it appears to the Court that: "The Polish Government, abandoning the exclusive course which it seemed in the first instance to have adopted, now intends to avail itself of the right conferred upon it, as a party to the Treaty of Versailles, by Article 63 of the Statute." 4 Poland did not insist that the grounds for justifying the intervention under Article 62 should be taken into consideration. 5 PCIJ determined 1 the question on the basis of Article 63. 6 It seems unclear, however, whether the Court could have regarded the request to intervene under Article 62 as a declaration of intervention under Article 63 if Poland had insisted on taking the same course as her original one. The Court itself appears to have left this question open by saying: "The attitude thus adopted renders it unnecessary for the Court to consider and satisfy itself whether Poland's intervention in the suit before it is justified by an interest of a legal nature, within the meaning of Article 62 of the Statute." 7 In this connection, a question may arise whether a third State party to a convention should be permitted to intervene in a case where the construction of the convention was in question if the State submitted a request to that effect under Article 62 without invoking Article 63. The primary objective of this research is to find a new answer to such an old question. In view of the so-called 'resurrection' of intervention in recent cases before ICJ, the question seems to have more practical importance than before. This paper is composed of five parts including Introduction and Conclusion. Part two will make a distinction between the two forms of intervention under the relevant provisions of the Statute. One is the so-called "discretionary intervention" under Article 62 of the ICJ Statute, and the other is the "intervention as of right" 8 under Article 63. Part three will analyze legal interests of a third State in the interpretation of a multilateral treaty to which it is also a party in light of the requirements for intervention under Article 62 of the Statute. Under Article 62, a would-be intervener should prove that: (1) "it has an interest of a legal nature"; and (2) "which may be affected by the decision in the case." Part four will review the effects of judgments on intervening States. The author will review those effects on an intervener as a party and on a nonparty intervener consecutively.
II. Differences between the Two Forms of Intervention

A. Discretionary Intervention
The concept of 'discretionary intervention' first appeared in the draft plans for
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For the use of the terms 'discretionary intervention' and "intervention as of right," see, e.g., C. interest of a legal nature can be shown, so that political intervention will be excluded, and to
give the Court the right of decision.
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The draft text of Article 62 of the PCIJ Statute for discretionary intervention is substantially identical with that of the ICJ Statute. The ICJ Statute just deleted the phrase "as a third party" after "to be permitted to intervene" in the 2. Every State so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings; but if it uses this right, the construction given by the judgment will be equally binding upon it.
Whereas Article 62 gives ICJ some discretion whether or not to grant a third State permission to intervene, Article 63 is formulated in terms of a right to intervene, i.e., a third State party to the convention in question does not need to seek permission to intervene from the Court. Under Article 63, it is not necessary for a wouldbe intervener to prove an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case, save that it is a party to the convention whose interpretation is in question in the case. 23 Although Article 63 offers States parties to a multilateral treaty a seemingly wide opportunity to intervene, it has rarely been used.
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Judge Gaja has asserted that States are generally reluctant to invoke this right mainly because the intervener should be bound by the interpretation of the Court in accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2. 25 Judge Oda Shigeru has noted: "There will not be much difference between those States which have intervened in a case and those States which have not intervened, so far as the practical effect of the Court's construction of an international convention is concerned" 26 Although the Court's decision would influence the interpretation of the treaty in question for all States parties, it is not formally binding on any State that is neither a party to the case nor an intervener in the proceedings. States potentially interested in submitting observations seem to hesitate to do so because it would formally bound by the interpretation of the Court. Considering such general reluctance, only the State having a real interest in the interpretation of the convention will invoke her right of intervention under Article 63. Judge Hudson noted: "The fact that a State is a party to a convention to be construed may be regarded as establishing that State's legal interest so that a judgment of the Court will not ordinarily be required."
27 Professor Rosenne has also asserted: "Hints were given during the drafting of the Statute in 1920, that intervention under Article 63 is a form of intervention to protect an interest of a legal nature, not which may be affected by the decision in the case but in a more limited sense that it may be affected by the interpretation given by the Court to the multilateral treaty in question."
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Article 63 provides the only requirement for the third party's intervention, "the construction of a convention to which States other than those concerned in the case are parties is in question." However, ICJ has stated in the Haya de la Torre case that "every intervention is incidental to the proceedings in a case" and accordingly "a declaration filed as an intervention only acquires that character in law if it actually relates to the subject-matter of the pending proceedings."
29 Thus, Article 63 seems to require that the interpretation of a provision in the convention should be disputed between the parties to the case. 30 Even in this case, however, a third State party to the convention cannot intervene into the interpretation of another provision of the convention which has nothing to do with each other. real and concrete as opposed to general interest which can be regarded as too remote from the specific situation at issue in the main proceedings.36 It will not be sufficient for a would-be intervener based solely on Article 62 to show merely that it is a party to the convention to be construed by the Court in the case.
In the Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan case, ICJ has admitted that some of the treaties which the Philippines invoked may have shown a certain interest in legal considerations before the Court. 37 In these instruments, however, the Philippines has not shown any legal interest that might be affected by the Court's interpretation in the main proceedings, because either they form no part of the arguments of Indonesia and Malaysia, or their respective reliance on them does not bear on the issue of retention of sovereignty by the Sultanate of Sulu as described by the Philippines in respect of its claim in North Borneo. 38 In the Court's view, the interest shown by the Philippines would not be affected by the Court's interpretation in the main proceedings. Consequently, the Philippines has failed to discharge its burden of proving an interest of a legal nature in the meaning of Article 62 of the ICJ Statute.
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The Philippine Application being rejected, it would be still possible for a third State party to a multilateral treaty to have a legal interest in the Court's interpretation of the treaty in the case. While accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court by declaration, some States would have noticed that such a situation could happen. In the Declaration of 1946 accepting the Court's jurisdiction, the US excluded "disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court. which the United Kingdom and New Zealand were also parties. Nauru alleged that Australia breached its obligations arising from the Agreement under which Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom constituted the Administering Authority with respect to Nauru. 42 As the three States were joint trustees of the territory, Nauru's allegations against Australia were equally applicable to the United Kingdom and New Zealand. The obligations of the joint trustees owed to the beneficiary under the Agreement might be joint as contended by Australia or joint and several as contended by Nauru. 43 In either way, a finding by the Court regarding the existence and the content of the responsibility attributed to Australia by Nauru might well have implications for the legal situation of the other two States concerned.
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As the Trusteeship Agreement was no longer in force, Article 63 of the ICJ Statute could not be applied to that case. If the Agreement had been still in force and the interpretation of the Agreement had been contested at the merits phase, however, the United Kingdom and New Zealand could have intervened in the proceedings under Article 63, and arguably under Article 62 as well, under the condition that other requirements for intervention had been met. One of these requirements expressly stipulated in Article 62 is the possibility of the interest being affected by the decision in the case.
B. Possibility of Being Affected by the Court's Decision
A State seeking to intervene under Article 62 must request permission based on an interest of a legal nature "which may be affected by the decision in the case." It does not mean that the legal interest will be affected or must be affected. 45 47 the reasoning which constitute the necessary steps to the dispositif. Professor Bonafé has asserted: "It would not be asked to predict the decision of the Court on the merits, but it will have to take into account all the possible outcomes of the decision and demonstrate that there is at least a chance that the final decision in the main proceedings will affect its legal interests in order to be granted permission to intervene." 48 It is conceivable that a third State has a legal interest which would not only be affected by a decision but also form the very subject-matter of the decision. In such a case, the Court would not be able to continue the proceedings in the absence of the third State's consent to its jurisdiction. In their declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute, both the United Kingdom and New Zealand have excluded, inter alia, "disputes in respect of which any other party to the dispute has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice only in relation to or for the purpose of the dispute."
58 Although obscure, it could arguably protect the two States in view of the following considerations. First, there was no dispute between Nauru on the one hand and the United Kingdom or New Zealand on the other that Nauru might wish to bring to the Court. Second, Nauru accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court on January 29, 1988, and only sixteen months have passed until it submitted its application instituting proceedings against Australia on May 19, 1989. This limitation may have led Nauru to renounce instituting similar proceedings against the United Kingdom and New Zealand.
59
Articles 63 as well as 62 being silent on the status of an intervening State as a party or as a non-party and the question of jurisdictional link, the same considerations discussed above would be applicable. In the Whaling in the Antarctic case, New Zealand intervenes under Article 63 as a non-party without indicating any jurisdictional link between itself and the parties to the case. 
IV. Effects of Judgments on Intervening States
A. Effects on a Party Intervener
If a State intervenes as a party either under Articles 62 or 63, the decision of the Court in the case will be binding upon the intervening State in accordance with Article 59 of the ICJ Statute. Article 59 provides that: "The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case." Thus, the decision is in principle res inter alios acta (a matter which, in law, exclusively concerns others) for States other than the parties to the case. While the term 'decision' used in Article 59 mainly concerns judgments on the merits, it also covers other decisions such as judgments on preliminary objections and orders indicating provisional measures. No decision should be excluded from the ambit of Article 59 if the content can be bound. 63 In principle, only the operative part of judgment or other decision has binding force. ….in respect of a particular judgment it may be necessary to distinguish between, first, the issues which have been decided with the force of res judicata, or which are necessarily entailed in the decision of those issues; secondly any peripheral or subsidiary matters, or obiter dicta; and finally matters which have not been ruled upon at all. 65 The term 'binding force' laid down in Article 59 should be distinguished from the force of res judicata. For judgments of ICJ, the force of res judicata results from the combined effect of Articles 59, 60 and 61. 66 In the Bosnian Genocide case, ICJ has explained:
The 
B. Effects on a Non-Party Intervener
When the construction of a convention to which the intervener is also a party is in question, the construction given by the Court's judgment will be equally binding upon A third State can intervene as a non-party under Article 62 only if its legal interest may be affected by the decision in the case. The legal interest of a non-party intervener under Article 62 might be affected by the decision in the case only if the decision could have some legal effect on the intervener. Although the Chamber has declared that the judgment on the merits is not res judicata for a non-party intervener, 80 it does not amount to say that the judgment could have no legal effect on such an intervener. Therefore, a more reasonable interpretation of Article 62 taken together with Article 63 would be that a non-party intervener should be bound, at least to a limited extent, by the decision in the proceedings in which it intervened.
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Indeed, Professor Chinkin asserts that, by analogy with Article 63, a non-party intervening State must be bound by the judgment to the extent that it relates to the intervention. 82 To the same effect, L'Institut de Droit International adopted a resolution in 1999 at the Berlin Session, which declared as follows:
The decision of the court or tribunal is binding on the intervening State to the extent of the admitted intervention. To the same extent, the decision is binding on the principal parties in their relations with the intervening State. it is something other than res judicata, as is the case of orders indicating provisional measures for the principal parties. First, the term 'decision' used in Article 62 is broader in scope than that used in Article 59, since the former includes not only the operative part of judgment but also the reasons constituting the necessary steps to it. The reasons included in the judgment do not in principle have the force of res judicata. 84 Second, a situation can be envisaged where a third State intervenes under Article 62 as a non-party to protect its rights which impose corresponding obligations upon one of the original parties to the case but the party admits in the proceedings an allegation to the detriment of the non-party intervener's rights. If those rights were consequently affected by the decision of the Court, that decision would not prevent the non-party intervener from submitting to the Court an application instituting fresh proceedings against the original party.
V. Conclusion
When the interpretation of a multilateral treaty is in question in a case before ICJ, a third State party to the treaty has the right to intervene under Article 63 of the ICJ Statute. It is conceivable that such a third State has also a legal interest which may be affected by the interpretation of the treaty given in the judgment in the case and accordingly may submit a request for permission to intervene under Article 62. Such a third State can invoke one of the two provisions alone or both of them simultaneously.
In accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2 of the ICJ Statute, an intervener even as a non-party to the case would also be bound, at least to a limited extent, by the decision in the proceedings. For an intervener as a party to the case, the operative part of the judgment will have the force of res judicata by the combined effect of Articles 59, 60 and 61. For a non-party intervener, the decision under Article 62 would not have such force. However, it would bind upon the intervener to the extent where admitted.
In so far as an intervening State is bound by the Court's judgment, there would be no significant difference between the two types of intervention under the ICJ Statute. If a State may intervene under both Articles, it would choose between Articles 62 and 63 according to the relative burden of proof and the relative scope of
